The recent bombing tragedy at the 2013 Boston Marathon highlights the importance of detecting and monitoring potentially threatening activity within large crowds of people (Schrotenboer, 2013) . Sensor systems incorporating explosive detection technologies are exceedingly costly and of limited reliability, restricting their widespread use in civilian or military settings (Kaplan & Kress, 2005; Martinez-Lorenzo, Quivira, & Rappaport, 2012) . For these reasons, leveraging human perception and intuition is critical to recognizing behavioral indicators that might predict adverse events (Kaplan, Mintz, & Mishal, 2006) . However, research in experimental psychology has largely neglected identifying the range of cues humans use to perceive threatening behavior among large crowds of people. This is particularly unfortunate given that civilian and military surveillance often relies upon human observers monitoring large groups of people for suspicious activity; understanding the threat cues humans spontaneously rely upon can provide important insights into threat perception in general, and the development of training programs and deployment of automated detection systems. Toward this goal, the present experiments provide a first examination of static and dynamic crowd characteristics deemed relevant to human detection of potentially threatening activity.
Threat Perception
The vast majority of research examining threat perception comes from the social, cognitive, and affective sciences in their examination of facial expressions and body movements. Facial expressions convey a variety of emotions, and accurately perceiving these expressions is critical to social communication and inferring the affective states of others. Physiological, behavioral, and neuroscience evidence demonstrates several basic facial expressions of emotion (Ekman, 1999) , and processing emotional expressions appears to recruit a distinct neural network (Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999) . A now seminal finding in social cognition demonstrates that humans quickly and preattentively identify affectively threatening expressions (e.g., an angry face) within a crowd of otherwise monotonous faces (e.g., happy or neutral faces), called the face-in-the-crowd effect (Hansen & Hansen, 1988) . Similarly, humans are remarkably good at inter-preting body language indicative of particular affective states, such as fear or anger (de Gelder, 2006; Meeren, van Heijnsbergen, & de Gelder, 2005) .
Darwin proposed that humans have evolved to recognize simple and easily detectable cues that indicate potential threat (Darwin, 1872 (Darwin, /1965 . When perceiving individuals, these are readily apparent in facial expressions and body language, but it is unclear how similar perceptions might be made when viewing large groups of people from a distance. Crowds of individuals moving in and around environments present a unique case when perceiving emergent threats involves monitoring both individual and group-level behavior. Indeed, suspicious individuals may behave in somewhat predictable ways (Blechko, Darker, & Gale, 2009; Darker, Gale, & Blechko, 2008) , and nearby individuals may react to such behavior (either implicitly or explicitly) by altering their own behavior (Faria, Krause, & Krause, 2010; Gallup et al., 2012; Moussaïd, Helbing, & Theraulaz, 2011) .
Human Crowd Perception
Though very little research has investigated the specific movement cues observers use to recognize emergent threats within a crowd, some related work has elucidated the perceptual and cognitive mechanisms responsible for tracking and understanding coordinated movement. Thornton (Thornton & Vuong, 2004) demonstrated that observers quickly and automatically process the movements of multiple entities, and may do so using specialized visual mechanisms to pool individual movements into summary representations regarding a crowd's overall movement direction and velocity (Sweeny, Haroz, & Whitney, 2012) . In fact, this type of summary coding is even more accurate and rapid than perceiving individual motions (Sweeny et al., 2012) . The ability to quickly extract coarse information regarding crowd motion has been demonstrated with both biological motion (Blakemore, Winston, & Frith, 2004; Sweeny et al., 2012; Thornton & Vuong, 2004) , and simple geometric shapes such as isosceles triangles or dots (Atchley & Andersen, 1995; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) . Upon perceiving coordinated movement, individuals appear to further extract causal information and social intentionality (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) . For instance, Heider (Heider & Simmel, 1944) demonstrated that animated triangles and circles elicit reliable perceptions of intentional agent behavior including attributions of personality traits and emotions, such as describing an entity as shy or a bully, or as frustrated or angry. These effects have been replicated and extended several times (Berry, Misovich, Kean, & Baron, 1992; Bloom & Veres, 1999; Kassin, 1981) and are largely attributed to spontaneous perceptions of kinematic motion, such as monitoring the speed and direction of coordinated movement.
Much of the previously mentioned research has used relatively simple coordinated movements among small numbers of entities, such as watching a large triangle chase two smaller shapes (Heider & Simmel, 1944) , a ball collide with several small squares (White & Milne, 1999) , or two small balls interacting (Michotte, 1963) . While this research has been of considerable value in defining how and when observers perceive animacy, causality, and intentionality from moving shapes, it is not clearly applicable to perceiving threats while observing relatively large-scale crowd behavior. Indeed, the interactions among entities in earlier work are scripted and specifically aimed at understanding relatively simple interactions among a few entities, such as following, pulling, bursting, and chasing. The work does, however, nicely demonstrate that individuals are able to reflexively perceive animacy and intentionality among otherwise abstract simple shapes, perceiving geometric shapes as intentional agents. We leverage some procedures from this research in developing our stimuli, but ask very different questions. First, we ask whether several basic static crowd parameters influence subjective estimates of potential for a threatening event. Second, we ask whether any identified crowd parameters remain predictive when entities within a crowd move among themselves. Finally, we assess the relative predictive value of multiple crowd movement parameters in modulating perceptions of risk, and examine the reliability of crowd parameter influences across individual observers.
Given the inherent complexities of identifying predictive behaviors and monitoring crowds for such patterns, the literature stands to benefit from an examination of crowd-and individual-level parameters that observers spontaneously process while attempting to identify the onset of adverse events. For humans, though detecting threatening behavior often seems intuitive, it is exceedingly difficult because individuals vary widely in the nature and extent of perceptible manifestations of stress (e.g., sweating, fidgeting); in fact, the Transportation Safety Administration has come under recent pressure for training employees to detect behaviors that are only rarely indicative of actual threats (Tierney, 2014) . If identifying threatening individuals is no greater than chance after training, then one questions the validity or utility of training procedures and associated behavioral indicators. In response to this feedback, the Government Accountability Office has attributed the failure of such training in behavioral detection to an absence of scientifically validated evidence (Government Accountability Office, 2013) . In other words, basic and applied research is necessary to identify the fundamental principles of threat detection while observers view individuals moving in crowds: what behavioral factors do observers spontaneously perceive? Do these factors vary across individual observers? What are the relative emphases placed on these factors? And, might these factors ultimately hold utility in identifying the emergence of threats?
The present research takes a first step toward answering such questions by asking participants to view static (Experiments 1-2) or dynamic (Experiments 3-5) crowds while estimating the inherent risk of a suicide bombing. There are several possible indicators of an emerging threat. For instance, one might focus on the behavior of one or more individuals who display suspicious behavior such as avoiding proximity to law enforcement, moving in a direction dissimilar to others, showing erratic headings, or maintaining low visibility. Though these specific behaviors manifest at the level of individuals, they lead to interactive influences on crowd behavior. For instance, others must avoid collision with an individual moving in a direction counter to others, or may move away from what they perceive as irregular behavior. In this manner, identifying suspicious behavior may involve monitoring both individuals and the crowd as a whole (Gallup et al., 2012) . To gain insights into some of these patterns, we conducted interviews with Army personnel (N ϭ 4) trained specifically in urban surveillance. Relevant to the present work, this training typically involves understanding the tactical elements of surveillance (e.g., concealment, stalking), as well as the selection of individuals for monitoring within crowds. We were most interested in the latter com-ponent: what cues are these soldiers trained to recognize, and how does training relate to actual operational experiences (i.e., additional cues and/or underused cues)? These soldiers revealed several interesting pieces of information. First, urban surveillance training teaches soldiers to identify patterns of activity within groups that might indicate something is "amiss." For instance, they are taught to observe and log patterns over time and then look for deviations from what would be predicted by context (e.g., time of day, weather, cultural events). In our later experiments, this finding motivated real-time risk ratings over extended periods of time (5-30 min). Second, they are taught to attend to specific individual behaviors, such as maligned posture (e.g., holding or carrying an awkward or uncomfortable device) or deviating from the heading or velocity of surrounding individuals. This finding motivated post hoc scoring of crowd movements to quantify these particular types of entity behaviors. Third, they are taught to notice crowd-level predictors of individual threats; for instance, threats may target particularly high-density crowds with high casualty potential, such as during sporting or political events. Large and high-density crowds are often targeted by suicide bombers and are among the first crowd-level factors we chose to manipulate herein. Crowds may also reveal threat emergence through their interactive behavior, such as moving away from and/or looking directly at or away from a threat. Thus, both soldiers and the extant literature indicate that perceiving emergent threats involves monitoring both individuals and the interactions between individuals and the remainder of a crowd. Finally, soldiers are also taught to use contextual information to guide baseline estimates of risk; for instance, recent history of suicide bombings should increase vigilance and reduce thresholds for detecting abnormal behavior. Of course, using contextual information to guide threat perception can be advantageous at times, but also lead to response biases of negative consequence (Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003) .
Automated Crowd Perception
Crowds vary along multiple dimensions, including scope (occupied area), number of individuals, density (spacing between individuals), and rate and direction of movement (Cheriyadat & Radke, 2008; Kilambi, Ribnick, Joshi, Masoud, & Papanikolopoulos, 2008; Rahmalan, Nixon, & Carter, 2006) . Crowd tracking and analysis research has largely focused on estimating crowd size and density, and recognizing or predicting movement behavior (Silveira Jacques Junior, Musse, & Jung, 2010; Zhan, Monekosso, Remagnino, Velastin, & Xu, 2008) . Much of this work is motivated by intuitive hypotheses about crowd variables that should indicate potentially problematic behavior, such as crowd size and density. These two particular variables also overlap with those demonstrated by the blast dissipation literature as critical to predicting casualty rates following an explosion (Kaplan & Kress, 2005; Kress, 2005) . For instance, as the density increases for a particular crowd size, casualty rates initially increase but then decrease as more individuals insulate others from a blast. Accurately estimating crowd size and density is a difficult task, particularly with highly dynamic crowds (e.g., subway stations, tourist attractions). Several crowd counting and density estimation models have been developed, relying on inputs from computer vision systems, and using pixel-based (Velastin & Davies, 1995) , texturebased (Marana, Velastin, Costa, & Lotufo, 1998) , and/or objectlevel analyses (Zhao & Nevatia, 2003) to extract features and derive estimates. These models tend to be validated with lowmovement and low-density crowds, and are thus of limited reliability with more realistic crowds.
A relatively restricted body of research has developed methods for tracking individuals within a crowd, over time, toward a fuller monitoring of crowd dynamics (Ali & Shah, 2008; Rodriguez, Ali, & Kanade, 2009) . Reliably identifying individual (object-level) and crowd (holistic-level) behavior might prove valuable for identifying potential danger or an emergency within a crowd. For instance, identifying one or a few individuals moving in contrast to the overall direction or velocity of a crowd (Silveira Jacques Junior et al., 2010), or recognizing unusual movement sequences (Brostow & Cipolla, 2006) , might indicate potentially suspicious behavior, and sudden changes in the number of individuals or density of a crowd might indicate an emergent threat (Wu, Liang, Lee, & Xu, 2006) .
A major challenge in this area, however, is the limited availability of crowd video footage under both normal and emergency circumstances. For this reason, identifying the most valuable (i.e., the most reliable) movement parameters is inherently difficult and can only be assessed reactively following an incident; for instance, following an explosion one could assess whether an observer or system noted particular patterns of behavior at the individual or group level that may have proven valuable in predicting the adverse event. Furthermore, several behavior tracking algorithms require manual initialization of each entity (i.e., a priori tagging of each to-be-tracked individual within a crowd), which can be timeconsuming, error-prone, and costly to establish and maintain.
Potential Crowd-and Individual-Level Predictors
The reviewed literature demonstrates progress in computer vision and algorithm development for measuring, analyzing, and potentially tracking crowds. We also note several recent advances in understanding joint attention and the emergence of interactive behavior from the perspective of individuals within a crowd (Faria et al., 2010; Gallup et al., 2012; Moussaïd et al., 2011) . However, the development of sensor systems and algorithms has proceeded largely in the absence of supporting research examining the range of cues humans use when monitoring crowds for potential threats such as gunmen, suicide bombers, or individuals placing improvised explosives. This is particularly alarming given that these sensors and algorithms are expected to replace, and potentially match the accuracy and efficiency of, human observers in surveillance duties (Velastin & Davies, 1995) .
The present experiments were aimed at progressively understanding how crowd-and individual-level behaviors influence observers' perceptions of threat while viewing static or dynamic crowds. First, we examine two crowd-level parameters that have received attention in the computer vision and blast dissipation literature: crowd size (number of individuals) and density. Suicide bombing attacks tend to occur in high-density crowds in proximity to a large number of victims, usually by concealing an explosive device and attempting to mingle inconspicuously within a crowd (Almogy et al., 2004) . To a prospective suicide bomber, such situations are high risk (of premature detection) but also high reward given potentially high casualty rates (Hoffman, 2003; Richardson, 2006) . Lay understanding of such principles may guide 3 CROWDS AND THREAT PERCEPTION observer threat perception; specifically, an observer might attempt to infer terrorist mental states and thus deem larger and higher density crowds as inherently high risk. At least two additional factors may increase risk estimates while observers view larger and higher density crowds. First, monitoring tasks become more difficult as the number of entities increases (Cavanagh & Alvarez, 2005) , and increased attentional load may reduce thresholds for perceiving threats (De Martino, Kalisch, Rees, & Dolan, 2009) . In other words, observers may become more sensitive to threatrelated behaviors under the relatively high attention loads associated with an increased number of monitored individuals; of course, such an effect would be expected to emerge with dynamic rather than static displays. Second, higher density arrays may enhance the detection of entities showing orientations deviating from the crowd; for instance, if one or a few individuals show particularly aberrant orientations relative to others, this might attract more attention in a high relative to low-density array (Motter & Belky, 1998) . Thus, high-density arrays may lead participants to be more sensitive to orientation differences, and these may carry value in perceiving threats.
Of course, in dynamic displays the inherent complexity of the task increases and likely introduces a number of additional, as yet unknown, factors that influence threat perception. These factors likely lie at the level of both individual entities (e.g., one individual "hiding" behind a building, or "wandering" away from and then returning to the crowd) and the group as a whole. To begin exploring the influence of such factors, in Experiments 4 -5 we probe observers for insights regarding patterns of movement they deemed particularly influential in guiding threat estimates. We then use these insights to drive analyses of simulations and derive their values in predicting threat estimates.
Experiment 1
Our first experiment examines spontaneous perceptions of threat potential while human observers view static depictions of simulated crowds. We chose to begin with static images for two primary reasons; first, human observers are frequently tasked to provide surveillance by reviewing still crowd images, and second, we intended to begin with the most basic and highly controlled depiction of a crowd. We asked whether parametrically varying the number and density of depicted entities influences perceived risk of a suicide bombing; based on the interviews described earlier, we also asked whether historical risk might modulate perceived risks. To manipulate historical risk, we provided participants with varied historical background information about the environment containing the crowd; specifically, we prefaced trials by explicitly priming either a neutral, low, or high incidence rate of suicide bombings. In Experiment 1, we compared neutral (no stated risk) with low historical risk, and in Experiment 2 we compared neutral with high historical risk.
To increase our level of experimental control and decrease the possible influence of individual stimulus characteristics (e.g., gender, attire, stature) driving risk estimates we developed stimuli conforming to earlier research using basic shapes. In that work, the authors found that observers tend to perceive isosceles triangles as animate entities with individual intentions (Heider & Simmel, 1944; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000) . In all of our experiments, we thus use arrays of isosceles triangles depicted against an aerial view of a coarse map with several building outlines. We consider only observers' spontaneous perceptions of threat while viewing crowd stimuli; because these simulated crowds never actually display an adverse event, we do not assess whether these perceptions are accurate (i.e., whether they hold value toward identifying actual threats). Rather, we ask how individuals might use basic crowd parameters to modulate spontaneous assessments of whether a threat might emerge in a depicted crowd, without any influence of actual adverse events. Based on extant literature and interview results, we hypothesized that participants would show the strongest reliance on crowd size and density, and relatively low reliance on historical information, when estimating the inherent risk of a crowd display.
Method
Participants and design. Thirty-six active duty male members of the U.S. Army volunteered to participate (M age ϭ 21.1, SD age ϭ 2.6). In all experiments, individuals provided consent in accordance with institutional review board (IRB)-approved procedures. Participants had completed basic and advanced individual training, and 4 were specifically trained in topics relevant to urban and aerial surveillance; note that follow-up analyses suggested no difference in risk estimate behaviors between these 4 individuals and the remaining participants.
We used a 2 ϫ 6 ϫ 6 within-participants design: historical background information was manipulated across two levels (2: neutral, low risk), crowd size was manipulated across 6 levels (6: 10, 14, 18, 22, 26, 30 entities) , and density across 6 levels (6: highest, high, medium-high, medium-low, low, lowest). Additional information about our density manipulation is provided in the Procedure section.
Materials.
Instructions. Participants were informed that they would "view a series of images that display crowds in an urban environment." They were instructed, for each image, to "estimate how likely (0 -100%) a suicide bomb attack would take place." Finally, they were informed that they "have up to 30 seconds to view the image and make a response." For the historical background manipulation, participants were either given no information (neutral control) about risk, or were told that "Recent reports indicate that there have been a low number of suicide bomb attacks in this location."
Crowd stimuli. We generated six map templates that depicted a schematic overhead view of a city square. Each template was 900 ϫ 900 pixels (px) and depicted 8 simple buildings that occupied approximately 8% of the total template area (Figure 1 ). Crowds were placed onto templates at runtime and were depicted by placing black isosceles triangles ("entities") in pseudorandomly selected locations and orientations (implied headings) conforming to the following constraints: first, entity centers must be at least 15 px from building and template edges; second, entity centers must conform to density condition-contingent minimum and maximum distances from each other (described later).
Procedure. Participants were seated at individual computer work stations, and all stimuli were presented on a 24" monitor (1,280 ϫ 1,024 px) using custom-developed software. Participants provided consent and then completed a 36-trial practice session followed by two experimental blocks, each containing 144 trials.
The first block was always the neutral condition (no historical information), and the second block was described as low risk. In this manner, each participant viewed 144 neutral trials, and then 144 trials prefaced by low risk historical information. Neutral was always presented first to reduce potential carry-over effects following non-neutral risk information; to support this decision, we also confirmed that, on average, participant ratings showed reduced variability by the end of the 36-trial practice session (binned into 6-trial conditions: SD 1 ϭ 7.8, SD 2 ϭ 3.9, SD 3 ϭ 4.9, SD 4 ϭ 2.7, SD 5 ϭ 2.8, SD 6 ϭ 1.8). Within each experimental block, participants viewed the 144 unique trials in random order, with 4 trials representing each of the 36 cells of our factorial design (6 entity conditions ϫ 6 density conditions). Stimuli representative of the four most extreme combinations of entity quantity and density are depicted in Figure 1 , a-d.
Stimuli were created at program runtime, which involved selecting one of the six templates for each block, and then placing entities in accordance with each trial's condition. The first entity would be placed in a random position with the exception that it was at least 15 px from a template or building edge; each successive entity would be placed while conforming to the minimum edge distance, as well as density criteria. To manipulate density across the six levels, we established six interentity minimum distances: 15, 30, 45, 60, 75, 90 px; maximum distance was constant at 90 px. Distances were selected to prevent entity-entity contact at close distances and to ensure that all entities could be placed within the environment's boundaries at far distances. Successive entities were placed such that minimum and maximum distance related to the entity placed immediately prior, but only minimum distance related to all previously placed entities. Triangle orientation was not controlled.
For each trial, participants were asked to estimate the probability (0%-100%) of a suicide bomb attack by entering a numerical estimate into a text box. Participants were given 30 s to respond to each trial, after which time the trial would time out and the next trial would be presented.
Results
Analysis. We submitted probability estimates to a repeatedmeasures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with three repeated measures, Historical Risk (2: neutral, low risk), Crowd Size (6: 10, 14, 18, 22, 26, 30 entities), and Crowd Density (6: highest, high, medium-high, medium-low, low, lowest). We conducted a trend analysis by testing for linear and quadratic curve estimates via polynomial contrasts. In the case of a significant linear interaction, we conduct the same ANOVA and contrasts within conditions of interest.
Manipulation check. The experimental software automatically output crowd images displayed on all 10,368 experimental trials. We analyzed these images to confirm that our density manipulation reliably altered the average distances among entities in each Crowd Density condition. The average distance between entities varied reliably (p Ͻ .001 in an ANOVA) as a function of Crowd Density, with shorter average interentity distances (in pixels) at higher density conditions (M 1 ϭ 153.3, M 2 ϭ 173.6, M 3 ϭ 200.1, M 4 ϭ 227.8, M 5 ϭ 250.9, M 6 ϭ 271.4), confirming the effectiveness of our manipulation.
Risk estimates. Overall, risk estimates varied widely, ranging from 0% to 100% (M ϭ 47.6%, SD ϭ 15.2%), with an approximately normal distribution (Fisher's skewness ϭ .08). On average, 10.1 trials (3.5%) were removed for each participant because of nonresponse (time-out); there was no reliable condition-specific pattern with regard to removed trials. We report partial eta-squared values for effect sizes along with 95% confidence intervals around that number.
An Figure 2 .
To parse the interaction, we conducted two separate repeatedmeasures ANOVAs asking whether a Crowd Density effect would emerge, one in the neutral Historical Risk condition, and the other in the low risk condition. Within the neutral condition, there was a linear main effect of Crowd Density, F(1, 35) Figure  2 , in the neutral Historical Risk condition, risk estimates increase linearly with increasing Crowd Density; the low Historical Risk condition, however, shows a linear increase and then a leveling off of risk estimates at the highest two density levels (high, highest).
Discussion
Our first experiment examined whether crowd size, crowd density, and information about neutral versus low historical risk influence subjective probability estimates of a suicide bomb attack. Relative effect sizes (indicated by eta-squared values) demonstrated large (Cohen, 1988) effects of crowd size and density, with the crowd size effect approximately 30% larger than the crowd density effect. Supporting our hypotheses, as crowd size and density increased, risk probability estimates increased. Historical risk did not show any compelling influence on risk estimates; only at the highest crowd density did low historical risk show evidence for decreased risk estimates.
Experiment 2
Our second experiment was identical to Experiment 1 with a single exception: we compared neutral historical risk with a highrisk condition. Given Experiment 1 results, we hypothesized that crowd size and density would be the strongest predictors of risk estimates, with crowd size leading to larger effect than density. We also expected that high historical risk would increase overall risk estimates, but perhaps only at the extremes of crowd density.
Method
Participants and design. Thirty-six active duty male members of the U.S. Army volunteered to participate (M age ϭ 21.2, SD age ϭ 3.9); none had also participated in Experiment 1. Participants had completed basic and advanced individual training, and 5 were specifically trained in topics relevant to urban and aerial surveillance; as in Experiment 1, we note that follow-up analyses suggested no difference in risk estimate behaviors between these 5 individuals and the remaining participants. We used a 2 ϫ 6 ϫ 6 within-participants design: historical background information was manipulated across two levels (2: neutral, high risk), crowd size was manipulated across 6 levels (6: 10, 14, 18, 22, 26, 30 entities) , and density across 6 levels (6: highest, high, medium-high, medium-low, low, lowest).
Materials. Instructions were identical to Experiment 1, but for the Historical Risk manipulation, participants were either given no information (neutral control) about risk, or were told that "Recent reports indicate that there have been a high number of suicide bomb attacks in this location." Crowd stimuli were generated in an identical manner to Experiment 1.
Procedure. Procedures were identical to those employed in Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, neutral was always presented first to reduce potential carry-over effects following non-neutral risk information; to support this decision, we also confirmed that, on average, participant ratings showed reduced variability by the end of the 36-trial practice session (binned into 6-trial conditions: SD 1 ϭ 4.2, SD 2 ϭ 3.7, SD 3 ϭ 3.9, SD 4 ϭ 3.4, SD 5 ϭ 2.4, SD 6 ϭ 1.5).
Results
Analysis. Analyses matched the preceding experiment. Data from two participants were removed because of failure to follow instructions.
Manipulation check. The experimental software automatically output crowd images displayed on all 9,792 experimental trials. We analyzed these images to confirm that our density manipulation reliably altered the average distances among entities in each Crowd Density condition. The average distance between entities varied reliably as a function of Crowd Density, with lower average interentity distances (in pixels) at higher density conditions (M 1 ϭ 152.7, M 2 ϭ 172.4, M 3 ϭ 201.5, M 4 ϭ 228.2, M 5 ϭ 251.2, M 6 ϭ 273.2), confirming the effectiveness of our manipulation.
Risk estimates. Overall, risk estimates varied widely, ranging from 0% to 100% (M ϭ 40%, SD ϭ 20.4%), with an approximately normal distribution (Fisher's skewness ϭ .12). On average, 6.3 trials (2.2%) were removed for each participant because of nonresponse (time-out); there was no reliable condition-specific pattern with regard to removed trials.
An Figure 3 , both risk conditions show a linear increase in risk estimates as a function of increasing Crowd Density. However, the neutral risk condition does show lower risk estimates than the high risk condition in the lowest two density conditions. We tested for these in paired t tests comparing the risk conditions in the low and lowest density conditions; these comparisons did not reach significance (ps Ͼ .05).
Discussion
Our second experiment examined whether crowd size, crowd density, and information about neutral versus high historical risk influence subjective probability estimates of a suicide bombing. Relative effect sizes demonstrated a medium effect of crowd size and large effect of crowd density. We replicate Experiment 1 findings, but with a stronger reliance on crowd density versus size, and no reliable influence of historical risk on subjective risk estimates. Overall, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate consistently high reliance on both crowd density and crowd size, and minimal influence of historical risk information.
Experiment 3
Our third experiment was aimed at increasing the complexity, dynamics, and real-world applicability of our crowd simulations. To this end, we developed animated simulations of pseudorandom entity movements, and asked participants to make real-time estimates of perceived risk as crowd movements unfolded. Our intention was to engage participants in a vigilance task that involved observing simulated crowd movements over a sustained period of time and with a low probability of a critical event. As noted by Parasuraman and colleagues, though static display vigilance tasks have been well-studied, relatively few studies have investigated observer judgments while monitoring targets in motion (Parasura- (Howard, Gilchrist, Troscianko, Behera, & Hogg, 2011) .
Similar to the preceding experiments, we manipulated the number of crowd entities and crowd density; given the unreliable effects of historical context, we did not incorporate that factor in Experiments 3-4. We hypothesized that, similar to results found in Experiments 1 and 2, crowd size and density would increase overall risk estimations; however, given the dynamic nature of the stimuli, we further hypothesized that effects of crowd size and density would manifest over time as participants become increasingly aware of crowd characteristics.
Method
Participants and design. Thirty-six active duty male members of the U.S. Army volunteered to participate (M age ϭ 22, SD age ϭ 4.5); none had participated in Experiments 1 or 2. Participants had completed basic and advanced individual training, and 3 were specifically trained in topics relevant to urban and aerial surveillance; note that follow-up analyses suggested no difference in risk estimate behaviors between these 3 individuals and the remaining participants.
We used a 3 ϫ 3 within-participants design: crowd size was manipulated across 3 levels (3: 10, 14, 18 entities), and density across 3 levels as defined by interentity distance thresholds (3: High: 45-540 px, Medium: 60 -630 px, Low: 75-720 px).
Materials.
Instructions. Participants were informed that they would "view a series 27 of videos that display crowds (black triangles) moving around in an urban environment." They were instructed, for each video, to continually "estimate the risk of a suicide bomb attack taking place by using the mouse scroll wheel to move a risk scale up (forward scroll) or down (backward scroll)."
Crowd stimuli and risk rating. We used the same six map templates from Experiments 1 and 2. Crowds were placed onto templates at runtime, and were depicted by placing black isosceles triangles ("entities") in pseudorandomly selected locations and orientations (implied headings) conforming to the following constraints: first, entity centers must be at least 15 px from building and template edges; second, entity centers must conform to density condition-contingent minimum and maximum distances from each other. A vertically oriented risk scale was positioned to the right of the crowd display, anchored with a lower label "No Risk" and upper label "Greatest Imaginable Risk."
Procedure. Participants were seated at individual computer work stations, and all stimuli were presented on a 24" monitor (1,280 ϫ 1,024 px) using custom-developed software. Participants provided consent and then completed one practice session followed by 27 experimental trials.
Initial placement of entities, and entity movements, were generated at program runtime so that each participant viewed unique crowds conforming to number and density conditions. Initial placement conformed to the procedure used in Experiments 1 and 2. We used a variable number of entities (3: 10, 14, 18) and densities (3) defined by both minimum and maximum ranges of interentity distances (High: 45-540 px, Medium: 60 -630 px, Low: 75-720 px).
Entity movement was generated in real-time with conditionspecific constraints, using the A ‫ء‬ pathfinding algorithm first described by (Hart, Nilsson, & Raphael, 1968) . In using this method, a 60 ϫ 60 invisible grid was overlaid onto the environment, with each cell constituting a (15 ϫ 15 px) navigable node; navigable nodes were not placed within 15 px of the template or building edges. Each entity randomly selects a single node as a waypoint and the pathfinding algorithm calculates a minimum cost path (i.e., a series of nodes) to the waypoint. Waypoints are randomly selected from any currently available nodes that are unoccupied by another entity. Entities then begin navigating along the path toward their respective waypoints, and the path is continually updated to avoid collision with other entities; collision was defined as more than one agent simultaneously occupying a single node. Once an entity reaches its designated waypoint, or in the event of a failed pathfinding (i.e., no path is available given potential for collision), a new waypoint is determined. Movement speed was held constant at 50 px per second.
Participants viewed a total of 27, 30-s videos, 3 for each of the 9 conditions of the 3 ϫ 3 design (3 entity quantities, 3 density levels). The risk rating scale depicted a slider to the immediate right of the video that always began positioned at vertical center; participants moved the scale up or down by scrolling forward or backward, respectively, using the mouse wheel. Ratings data were automatically sampled every 50 ms, and then collapsed by computing the mean of each 1-s increment; scale center was 50, with a maximum of 100 (greatest imaginable risk) and minimum of 0 (no risk; Cardello, Schutz, Lesher, & Merrill, 2005) . Within the first 5 s, 25 of 36 participants showed risk rating variability; within 10 s, all 36 participants showed risk rating variability.
Results
Analysis. Analyses matched the preceding two experiments. Data from two participants were removed because of failure to follow instructions.
Manipulation check. The experimental software automatically output entity coordinates over time. We analyzed interentity density to confirm that our density manipulation reliably altered the average distances among entities in each Crowd Density condition. The average distance between entities varied reliably as a function of Crowd Density, with lower average interentity distances (in pixels) at higher density conditions (M 1 ϭ 198.8, M 2 ϭ 230.4, M 3 ϭ 255.8), confirming the effectiveness of our manipulation.
Risk estimates. Overall, risk estimates varied widely, ranging from 0% to 100% (M ϭ 56.9, SD ϭ 36.5), with an approximately normal distribution (Fisher's skewness ϭ .11).
An ANOVA revealed a linear main effect of Crowd Size The Crowd Size ϫ Time interaction is depicted in Figure 4a ; over time, risk estimates decreased in the 10 entity condition, increased in the 14 entity condition, and increased most dramatically and then leveled off in the 18 entity condition. To test specifically for trend differences by condition over time, we conducted three separate repeated-measures ANOVAs, one for each Crowd Size condition, testing for linear and quadratic effects. In the 10 entity condition, we found a linear effect of Time, F(1,  36) This matches the initial linear increase, and then leveling off, in risk estimates over time within the 10 entity condition; observers appear to quickly assess condition-specific threat in the first 10 s of the simulation, and then do not show dramatic changes in perceived risk over the remainder of the simulation.
The Crowd Density ϫ Time interaction is depicted in Figure 4b ; over time, risk estimates increased and then leveled off in the high-density condition, but remained relatively stable in the low and medium density conditions. To test specifically for trend differences by condition over time, we conducted three separate repeated-measures ANOVAs, one for each Crowd Size condition, testing for linear and quadratic effects. In the high-density condition, we found linear, F (1, 36) 
Discussion
Our third experiment examined whether crowd size and crowd density would influence risk estimates over time, using dynamic crowd stimuli. Relative effect sizes demonstrated a large effect of crowd size and medium effect of crowd density. These effects were most pronounced during early viewing and tended to level off as the video progressed. Overall, we replicate Experiment 1 findings, showing a relatively strong influence of crowd size versus density, and extend this result to dynamic crowds.
Experiment 4
Our first three experiments used a factorial design, allowing us to parametrically manipulate crowd size and density. Though this method allows for a powerful test of these factors' independent and interactive effects on risk estimates, we also know that crowds typically vary dramatically in size and density over time. For instance, several people may briefly gather in a high-density arrangement surrounding a street performer, but may soon dissipate when the performance ends; furthermore, individual entities may move freely into and out of a monitored environment. The present experiment thus included the same environments and crowds as in Experiment 3, but now included an invisible navigable area around the environment's perimeter (i.e., entities could now navigate into an area that was off the screen). This design afforded entities entering and exiting the visible environment at random intervals. We also removed density restrictions, allowing entities to move closely to one another (minimum 15-px distance). In this manner, we will examine how dynamic changes in the number and density of entities over time influence risk estimates. We also understand that crowd size and density cues may be learned over the course of repeated crowd viewing; in other words, participants may come to realize the range of size and density manipulations and use this information while forming subsequent estimates. Thus, rather than asking participants to view multiple 30-s simulations, we used a single and relatively lengthy crowd movement exposure of 30 min. Finally, we administered a questionnaire instrument at the end of the study, asking participants to rate their subjective reliance on the two crowd parameters, and further provide feedback regarding additional movement patterns they may have relied upon; we use this feedback to evaluate the influence of several novel parameters. We predict similar results to Experiment 3, with crowd size and density influencing risk estimates over time, with a relatively strong influence of crowd size.
Method
Participants and design. Thirty-six (9 women) active duty members of the U.S. Army volunteered to participate (M age ϭ 21.6, SD age ϭ 2.7); none had previously participated in Experiments 1-3. Participants had completed basic and advanced indi- 
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CROWDS AND THREAT PERCEPTION vidual training, and 2 were specifically trained in topics relevant to urban and aerial surveillance; note that follow-up analyses suggested no difference in risk estimate behaviors between these 2 individuals and the remaining participants. Unlike the prior 3 experiments, we did not actively manipulate crowd size or density, but rather allowed for pseudorandom changes in these factors over time.
Materials.
Instructions. Participants were informed that they would view "a 30-min simulation that displays crowds (black triangles) moving around in an urban environment." They were instructed, for each video, to continually "estimate the risk of a suicide bomb attack taking place by using the mouse scroll wheel to move a risk scale up (forward scroll) or down (backward scroll)."
Crowd stimuli and risk rating. We used the same six map templates from Experiments 1-3, manipulated across participants. Each map template was modified to include a perimeter extending 200 px from all 4 sides, invisible to the participant; entities could freely wander into and out of this area. This perimeter size was determined by running 30-entity crowd simulations with 50-px perimeter width increments between 50 and 300 px; we found that a 200-px width produces an approximately normal (Fisher's skewness ϭ Ϫ.14) distribution of crowd size over the 30-min duration, and the minimum and maximum number of entities was highly similar to parameters used in Experiments 1-2 (M ϭ 20.7, min ϭ 10, max ϭ 30). As would be expected, smaller perimeter widths was correlated with higher mean crowd sizes given lower chances of several entities being simultaneously outside of the visible environment.
Crowds consisting of 30 entities were placed onto the full template space (visible and invisible areas) at runtime, and were depicted by placing black isosceles triangles ("entities") in randomly selected locations and orientations (implied headings) with entity centers at least 15 px from each other and from building and template edges. During the simulation, the number of entities was kept constant, but the number of visible entities (because of navigation into perimeter area) varied.
Debriefing questionnaire. Following the 30-min simulation, we asked participants to answer a series of ratings and open-ended responses regarding the crowd movement patterns they relied upon during their ratings. We asked 2 specific questions and elicited Likert ratings from 1 (Not a lot at all) to 6 (A very lot) regarding reliance on the number of visible entities and their density. We also provided space for open-ended responses to elicit additional movement patterns.
Procedure. Participants were seated at individual computer work stations, and the simulation was presented on a 24" monitor (1,280 ϫ 1,024 px) using custom-developed software. Participants provided consent and then completed a 1-min practice session followed by the 30-min crowd simulation. Practice data were not recorded.
Initial placement of entities, and entity movements, were generated at program runtime. Thirty entities, matching the highest crowd size used in Experiments 1-2, were placed onto the map. Minimum interentity distance was held constant at 15 px, allowing for high-density circumstances. As in Experiment 3, entity movement was generated in real-time using the A ‫ء‬ pathfinding algorithm. Movement speed was held constant at 50 px per second. Participants observed simulated movement for a total of 30 min during which they provided real-time risk estimates, and after which they completed the debriefing questionnaire.
Results
Analysis. Output files for each participant contained 18,000 time points (30 min at 10-Hz sampling frequency), and each time point contained details regarding current number of visible entities (Crowd Size), average visible interentity distance in pixels (Density), and current risk rating. Across all participants, crowd size varied from 10 to 30 (M ϭ 22.58; SD ϭ 2.42), and Density from 281.1 to 589.96 (M ϭ 435.61; SD ϭ 35.87). We conducted several regression-based analyses using mean-centered scores for all predictors; for all analyses we multiplied interentity distances by Ϫ1 to convert to a Density score (i.e., lower interentity distances indicating higher density), and report standardized ␤ values. First, we calculated a multiple regression for the entire sample, asking whether Crowd Size and Density would predict risk estimates; we also asked whether introducing temporal lags between perceiving crowd behavior and generating risk estimates would improve the fit of this model. Second, we conducted a set of exploratory analyses based on subjective reports of movement factors deemed indicative of increased risk; we asked whether several new factors would prove valuable for predicting risk estimates. Finally, we performed the same multiple regressions at the level of each participant to evaluate the relative reliability of each factor across participants; this was followed up by a series of participant-wise correlations to assess correlated reliance on individual crowd parameters. Two participants' data were removed because of software malfunction (1) and failure to modify risk ratings during the 30-min task (1).
Risk estimates. Overall, risk estimates varied widely, ranging from 0% to 100% (M ϭ 60.9, SD ϭ 22.1), with an approximately normal distribution (Fisher's skewness ϭ Ϫ.18). Over the course of the 30 min, risk estimates steadily increased and then leveled off around approximately 25 min (perhaps reflecting task disengagement as a result of continuous attention demands; Helton, Matthews, & Warm, 2009; Szalma et al., 2004) . This pattern was best represented by the following equation, y ϭ Ϫ1.3e Ϫ 007x 2 Ϫ 0.0044x ϩ 96.77. To statistically account for this trend, all analyses were performed using quadratic risk residuals to remove variability because of the quadratic effect over time. Given that risk estimates may lag behind the perception of entity behavior, we assessed whether introducing temporal lags would increase overall regression model fits. We conducted several linear regressions, one at each of six temporal lags (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 s) between the two predictors (Crowd Size, Density) and Risk ratings. All six regressions showed significance (ps Ͻ .0001), and peak F and R 2 values were obtained with a 4 second lag, F(2, 610605) ϭ 3627.7, R 2 ϭ 01. With the 4-s temporal lag, the regression model showed significant influences of both Crowd Size, ␤ ϭ .071, p Ͻ .0001, and Density, ␤ ϭ .08, p Ͻ .0001. This analysis demonstrates positive predictive value of both Crowd Size and Density in modulating risk estimates. It also demonstrates that it takes upward of 4 s for observers to perceive potentially risk-indicative entity behavior and translate that into a complete risk estimate; this particularly lengthy delay is partially because of the input mechanism used for providing risk estimates (mouse scroll wheel), which takes an average of 2.6 s to move between polar ends of our risk rating scale (based on pilot data).
Subjective outcomes. Relative reliance ratings. Likert ratings were coded as either a 0 (rated as not applicable, NA) or from 1 to 6 corresponding to provided ratings, and then averaged for each question. Overall, participants rated reliance on Crowd Size as a 4.79 (SD ϭ 1.51), and Density as a 4.94 (SD ϭ 1.39). Note that while this pattern suggests higher subjective reliance on Density, this difference did not approach significance, t(33) ϭ .47, p ϭ .64.
Open-ended responses.
To evaluate open-ended responses, we asked two full-time research assistants to parse a total of 31 responses into 10 representative categories, detailed in Table 2 ; disagreements were resolved using the Delphi technique to achieve interrater consensus (McKenna, 1994) . Exceedingly vague responses (e.g., I watched movement patterns) were excluded. For the top three categories mentioned by at least 10% of participants, we performed exploratory analyses assessing the predictive value of the named factors in modulating risk estimates. For each of the named factors we developed an automated scoring procedure (using Microsoft's C# programming language; Hejlsberg, Wiltamuth, & Golde, 2006 ) that reproduced the entity movements viewed by each participant and scored instances of particular behaviors (as defined later).
Hiding behind buildings. For each time point, we logged instances of entities "hiding" behind peripheral buildings, defined as buildings positioned within 200 pixels (along x or y axes) of map perimeters. To do so, we plotted vectors emanating from map center to each entity, and checked whether vectors intersected a defined peripheral building. Only when it did was the entity considered as hiding. This process was repeated for each of the 18,000 time points within each participant's unique sequence of observed crowd behavior. Overall, counts of hiding entities ranged from 0 to 11 (M ϭ 2.24, SD ϭ 1.58).
Grouping behavior. For each time point, we logged instances of 2 or more entities "grouping" together within a 50-pixel radius of each other. As an outcome, we determined the number of groups ("Group Count" range ϭ 0 to 9; M ϭ 2.23, SD ϭ 1.28), and the number of entities within each group ("Group Size" range ϭ 2 to 5; M ϭ 1.94, SD ϭ .59), at each of the 18,000 time points per participant.
Outcast/deviant behavior. For each time point, we logged instances of single entities moving "alone" outside of a minimum 200-pixel radius of any other entity. As an outcome, we determined the number of outcasts (range 0 to 8; M ϭ 1.56; SD ϭ 1.2), at each time point within each participant's unique sequence of observed crowd behavior.
Exploratory regression analyses. To evaluate the predictive value of the subjectively reported crowd factors modulating risk estimates, we conducted an exploratory multiple regression with six predictors: Crowd Size, Crowd Density, Hiding Count, Group Count, Group Size, and Outcast Count. The single dependent measure was estimated risk, with a 4-s temporal lag. The overall regression model was significant, but with an overall low predictive value, F(6, 610605) (Schroeder, Sjoquist, & Stephan, 1986) . Participant-wise correlated reliance. A correlation matrix relating participants' reliance (␤ values) on the six parameters revealed two basic patterns. Participants who showed reliance on Crowd Density tended to also show the same direction of reliance on Crowd Size (Pearson's r ϭ .61) and Hiding Count (Pearson's r ϭ .42).
Discussion
Our final experiment was designed to simulate relatively naturalistic crowd movements, allowing for a range of both crowd sizes and densities over time. Regression-based analyses demonstrated that randomly occurring variation in crowd size and density reliably predicted risk estimates, and that crowd size provided relatively strong and reliable (across participants) positive predictive value. We also performed a series of exploratory analyses that leveraged subjective feedback from participants regarding factors other than crowd size and density that may have modulated risk estimates. This process proved fruitful, demonstrating the reliable influence at least two additional factors, perceived "hiding" and "outcast" behavior, in driving risk estimates. It is interesting that participants also showed highly variable reliance, and directionality of reliance, on the six crowd parameters.
Experiment 5
Our fourth experiment was designed to test a relatively natural manifestation of entity movement, allowing entities to move into and out of the visible environment, and also allowing for relatively high-density movement patterns. We also explored whether participant-reported risk factors would prove reliable in modulating risk estimates. That experiment, however, generated unique entity movement patterns for each participant, and our regression model was only able to account for a very low proportion of risk estimation variability. The present experiment was designed to provide a relatively high power test of crowd behavior influences on risk ratings. To do so, a large sample of participants (N ϭ 520) viewed the same 5-min video of crowd movement. We hypothesized results similar to those found in Experiment 4, with both our initial crowd factors of interest (Crowd Size, Density) and participant-reported factors (Hiding Count, Group Count, Group Size, Outcast Count), showing value in predicting risk ratings over time. We also assessed whether additional participant-reported factors would prove valuable as predictors of risk estimates.
Method
Participants and design. Five hundred twenty (154 women) participants were recruited to participate (M age ϭ 31.8, SD age ϭ 10.1); none had previously participated in Experiments 1-4. Participants were sampled from the population of workers in Amazon's Mechanical Turk environment; all participants were located in the United States, had a minimum approval rating for prior work of 90%, and were reimbursed $1.00 for their participation. Digital informed consent was gathered, as approved by the Tufts University IRB. As in Experiment 4, we did not actively manipulate crowd size or density, but rather allowed for pseudorandom changes in these factors over time. A single video of crowd movement was shown to all participants.
Materials.
Instructions. Participants were informed that they would view "a 5-min simulation that displays crowds (black triangles) moving around in an urban environment." They were instructed, for each video, to continually "estimate the risk of a suicide bomb attack taking place by using the mouse scroll wheel to move a risk scale up (forward scroll) or down (backward scroll)."
Crowd stimuli and risk rating. Because all participants viewed the same crowd movements, we needed to develop a single 5-min sequence of crowd movement. To do so, we selected one of the map templates from the previous experiments and ran a 60-min simulation using the same crowd constraints as in Experiment 4. We then selected a 5-min epoch that showed high variability in crowd size and density. In this 5-min sequence, crowd size varied from 15 to 30 and approximated a normal distribution (M ϭ 22.5, SD ϭ 2.93; Fisher's skewness ϭ Ϫ.17), and interentity distance (in pixels) varied from 310.5 to 546.8 and also approximated a normal distribution (M ϭ 437.9, SD ϭ 41.3; Fisher's skewness ϭ .13). Because the Mechanical Turk environment mandates webbased viewing of stimuli and data logging, we developed a custom application using Microsoft Silverlight. This application displayed the 5-min video and the rating scale, and logged rating data over time (at 20 Hz) to a secure SQL database. To ensure that the video would not be downsized to fit participants' monitors, the application measured and enforced a minimum display resolution (1200 ϫ 900); prospective participants not meeting this criterion were not permitted to continue with the task. Procedure. Participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk, and viewed the video and interacted with the rating scale similarly to in Experiments 3-4. Participants provided digital informed consent, answered basic demographic questions (age, gender, experience with urban surveillance), and then completed one practice session followed by the 5-min crowd video. Practice data were not recorded. Participants observed simulated movement and provided real-time risk estimates. They then completed a mandatory openended question and submitted their data.
Results
Analysis. Output files for each participant contained 6,000 time points (5 min at 20-Hz sampling frequency), and each time point contained details regarding current number of visible entities (Crowd Size), average visible interentity distance in pixels (Density), and current risk rating ( Figure 5 ). In the same manner as Experiment 4, we also compiled data for each time point regarding Hiding Count, Group Count, Group Size, and Outcast Count. We conducted several regression-based analyses using mean-centered scores for all predictors; for all analyses we multiplied interentity distances by Ϫ1 to convert to a Density score, and report standardized ␤ values. First, we calculated a multiple regression for the entire sample, asking whether any of our six factors would predict risk estimates; we also asked whether introducing temporal lags between perceiving crowd behavior and generating risk estimates would improve the fit of this model. Second, we evaluated subjective reports for additional movement factors suggested as indicative of changing risk; we asked whether several new factors would prove valuable for predicting risk estimates. Finally, we performed the same multiple regressions at the level of each participant to evaluate the relative reliability of each factor across participants; this was followed up by a series of participant-wise correlations to assess correlated reliance on individual crowd parameters. Twenty-two (4.2%) participants' data were removed because of database errors (n ϭ 10), failure to modify risk ratings during the 5-min task (n ϭ 10), or showing a consistently oscillating (up/down) rating over time (suggesting noncompliance with instructions; n ϭ 2).
Risk estimates. Overall, risk estimates varied widely, ranging from 0% to 100% (M ϭ 45.8, SD ϭ 24), with an approximately normal distribution (Fisher's skewness ϭ .08) . Over the course of the 5 min, risk estimates steadily decreased and then increased back toward baseline (50%). This pattern was best represented by the following equation y ϭ le Ϫ 06x 2 Ϫ 0.0066x ϩ 47.402. To account for this trend, all analyses were performed using quadratic risk residuals rather than mean-centering. We conducted several linear regressions, one at each of six temporal lags (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 s) between the six predictors and Risk ratings. All six regressions showed significant predictive value (ps Ͻ .0001). Peak F values (and R 2 values) were obtained with a 4 second lag, F(6, 5919) ϭ 4529.5, R 2 ϭ .82. With the 4-s temporal lag, the regression model showed significant influences of all six predictors (ps Ͻ .0001), though of varied magnitude and direction.
Subjective outcomes.
Open-ended responses.
To evaluate open-ended responses, we parsed each participant's responses into the 10 representative categories listed in Table 4 , many of which overlap with Experiment 4 results. Four new predictors emerged from this analysis, each mentioned by at least 10% of participants. As in Experiment 4, for each of the named factors we developed an analysis procedure that scored instances of particular behaviors, as described here.
Proximity to buildings. For each time point, we logged instances of entities being within 100 pixels (along x or y axes) of building perimeters. To do so, we created a 100-pixel region surrounding building perimeters and logged instances of entities occupying this space over the course of the 5-min video. Overall, counts of entities close to buildings ranged from 0 to 13 (M ϭ 6.05, SD ϭ 2.27).
Common movement direction. For each time point, we logged instances of 2 or more entities "grouping" together within 50 pixels of each other and sharing a common heading (within 20°a ngle). Two measures came out of this analysis: first, the number Figure 5 . Experiment 5 z-scored mean values for crowd size and density, and risk estimates, over the course of the 5-min crowd movement (note that z-scores were computed from quadratic risk residuals).
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CROWDS AND THREAT PERCEPTION of groups that shared a common heading, and second the number of entities within each group. To form a composite index of common movement direction across all entities, we divided the total number of grouped entities by the number of groups; the average number of entities with common movement direction ranged from 2 to 7 (M ϭ 3.64, SD ϭ .52). Near center. For each time point, we logged the number of entities occupying the center area of the map, defined as falling within a 300-pixel diameter ring centered on the map. This diameter was large enough to cover a substantial portion of open central map space, but small enough so that it did not overlap with entities scored as proximal to buildings. Overall, counts of entities occupying the map's center space ranged from 0 to 8 (M ϭ 2.41, SD ϭ 1.72).
Erratic movements. To operationalize erratic movements, we measured variation in entity headings at each time point. For each entity, we measured heading differences at each time point (current time sample heading-previous time sample heading). To assess whether a given entity was moving erratically, we logged time points when the entity's absolute (i.e., positive-and negative-going angular deviation) heading deviation exceeded 2 SD of that entity's mean. As a measure, we summed the number of entities moving erratically at each time point. Overall, the number of erratically moving entities ranged from 0 to 23 (M ϭ 1.48, SD ϭ 1.49).
Exploratory regression analyses. To evaluate the predictive value of the four new subjectively reported crowd factors modulating risk estimates, we conducted an exploratory multiple regression with 10 predictors: Crowd Size, Crowd Density, Hiding Count, Group Count, Group Size, Outcast Count, Proximity to Buildings, Common Movement Direction, Near Center, and Erratic Movements. The single dependent measure was estimated risk, with a 4-s temporal lag. The overall regression model was significant, F(10, 5919) ϭ 2842.41, p Ͻ .001, R 2 ϭ .83, with all 10 independent variables providing predictive value: Crowd Size, ␤ ϭ .65, p Ͻ .001; Crowd Density, ␤ ϭ .482, p Ͻ .001; Hiding Count, ␤ ϭ Ϫ.055, p Ͻ .001; Group Count, ␤ ϭ Ϫ.044, p Ͻ .001; Group Size, ␤ ϭ Ϫ.027, p Ͻ .001; Outcast Count, ␤ ϭ .034, p Ͻ .001; Proximity to Buildings, ␤ ϭ Ϫ.055, p Ͻ .001; Common Movement Direction, ␤ ϭ Ϫ.018, p ϭ .001; Near Center, ␤ ϭ .07, p Ͻ .001; and Erratic Movements, ␤ ϭ .014, p ϭ .01.
Relative ␤ values suggest the strongest influence of Crowd Density, then Crowd Size, then Proximity to Center, and then Hiding Count and Proximity to Buildings. The other factors showed relatively low predictive value. However, a stepwise multiple regression demonstrated the highest model R 2 value (.828) when all 10 predictors were included.
Participant-wise regressions. For each participant we conducted a multiple regression with the 10 predictors and a single dependent variable (Risk). Each regression was conducted with a 4-s temporal lag. The overall regression model showed significant predictive value in all of the 498 participants (F min ϭ 14.84, F max ϭ 1774.9, F avg ϭ 358.2, all p Ͻ .001). Table 5 details the number of participants relying on each predictor and the direction- Cohen's (1988) threshold for moderateto-large effect sizes. This analysis revealed three basic patterns. Relationship between subjective and actual reliance. This final experiment, given its large sample size and mandatory openended feedback regarding parameter use, afforded a general analysis of relationships between subjective (reported) and actual (regression-indicated) reliance. To perform this analysis, we used a binary categorization to indicate whether each participant reported (1) or did not report (0) reliance on each of the 10 predictors: Crowd Size, Crowd Density, Hiding Count, Group Count, Group Size, Outcast Count, Proximity to Buildings, Common Movement Direction, Near Center, and Erratic Movements. We then used these values as predictors in a regression with individual parameter ␤ values as dependent variables. In this manner, reported reliance would be expected to positively predict ␤ values; though the overall regression model was significant, F(1, 4979) ϭ 57.29, p Ͻ .001, the predictive value of subjective responses was low, accounting for only about 1% of actual reliance, R 2 ϭ .011. Thus, though subjective responses were valuable for motivating parameter development, they only predicted a very small degree of actual reliance at the level of individual participants. Note that a follow-up regression using absolute ␤ values showed a similar result, F(1, 4979) ϭ 54.57, p Ͻ .001, R 2 ϭ .01.
Discussion
Our fifth experiment was a relatively powerful test of crowd parameter influences on risk estimates. A large sample of participants viewed the same 5-min video of crowd movement and made real-time risk ratings; they also provided open-ended feedback at the end regarding the crowd parameters they believed they had attended to while making risk estimates. In addition to the parameters identified in Experiment 4, four new parameters were added to analyses: Proximity to Buildings, Common Movement Direction, Near Center, and Erratic Movements. With these new predictors, we were able to account for 83% of risk estimate variation while participants viewed moving crowds. In some cases, the predictive value of these factors was positive and in other cases negative; furthermore, participants showed substantial differences in relative reliance on factors, and in the directionality of such reliance. Subjective reports at the level of individual participants did not prove valuable in predicting actual parameter reliance; though in aggregate participants were able to identify a range of possible strategies, they were not necessarily those employed by the individual during actual threat perception.
General Discussion
Our results expand upon a well-established literature on perceptions of intentionality in apparently random motion, extending back several decades (Heider & Simmel, 1944) . We have identified a set of 10 individual-and crowd-level parameters that appear at least partially responsible for driving risk estimates among human observers, and have demonstrated substantial interparticipant variability in relative reliance on these parameters. Our first two experiments investigated relatively simple instantiations of crowds, carefully controlling for crowd size and density, and eliminating the inherent complexities of entity movement, and further asking whether historical context might modulate risk estimates. In both experiments we found strong evidence that both crowd size and density modulate risk estimates; the relative influence of these two factors, however, was mixed. This result supports some earlier findings with moving circles (Bassili, 1976) . Specifically, Bassili showed observers two circles moving in scripted patterns relative to one another, and found high variability across participants regarding which cues they used to perceive animacy and intentionality. These first two experiments also demonstrated minimal influence of historical context in modulating risk estimates; in fact, an in-depth analysis of interactions showed only one statistically reliable influence of historical context.
Our third experiment showed that increasing crowd sizes strongly and consistently increased risk estimates, but that crowd density had a less consistent influence, with only the highest density levels reliably altering perceived risk. The real-time nature of our risk rating scale allowed us to examine how these effects manifest over time, leveraging procedures from extant research (Howard et al., 2011) . We found that observers modulated risk estimates rather quickly, with conditions diverging within approximately 5 s of simulation viewing, and then continuing to diverge for an additional 15-20 s. Thus, results found with static crowd images were largely replicated with moving crowds, and there was suggestion that crowd size proved a reliably stronger predictor of risk estimates relative to crowd density. Crowd size may contribute to risk estimates more strongly than crowd density for a few reasons. First, the larger crowd size may be more difficult to monitor and contribute to uncertainty on behalf of the observer, leading to increased risk estimates. Second, observers may infer the goal state of a suicide bomber as attempting to increase the casualty rate associated with a potential attack.
In our fourth experiment, we introduced a design feature that allowed entities to move in and out of the visible environment, widening the range of potential behaviors, possible number of visible entities, and emergent density. In addition, we also sought to reduce potential demand characteristics that may have led to reliance on crowd size and density simply because of repeatedly 15 viewing simulations that actively manipulated those factors. Results replicated earlier experiments, with both crowd size and density significantly modulating risk estimates; relative ␤ values demonstrated a stronger influence of crowd size, as also suggested by Experiment 3. We also used participants' retrospective reports to inform post hoc scoring of simulations at the level of each participant, aimed at extracting information regarding the number of hiding, grouping, and outcast entities over time. Detailed analyses, including a stepwise regression, demonstrated that only Hiding Count (Model 2), and perhaps also Outcast Count (Model 3) contributed to our model's predictive value. Furthermore, several of the identified predictors, including Hiding Count and Outcast Count, showed both positive and negative predictive value across participants. In other words, though we could predict with some accuracy that observers may use information regarding hiding and outcast behavior, it was particularly difficult to predict whether they would use it to increase or decrease risk ratings. These results shine light on how individual differences may modulate not only which crowd parameters are relied upon for estimating risk, but also how they are used. Indeed individual differences are becoming particularly important for predicting how observers might respond during sustained attention tasks (Shingledecker et al., 2010) , and possibly using such differences toward customizing training and adapting interfaces to enhance performance during applied tasks (Szalma, 2009) .
Our fifth experiment used a very large sample of observers and showed very similar variability in relative parameter reliance across participants. Using 10 predictors based on analysis of retrospective accounts, we found very high predictive value of our regression model, accounting for a substantial proportion of threat estimate variability. In addition to the parameters identified in Experiment 4, we demonstrated predictive value of how close entities got to buildings, when they showed common movement direction, when they moved through the center of the environment, and when they showed erratic headings. In the vast majority of cases, however, participants were not necessarily aware of which parameters they relied upon during simulation viewing, as evidenced by poor value of subjective reports in predicting actual reliance.
In our final two experiments we also conducted an exploratory correlational analysis that considered whether reliance (via ␤ values) on one particular parameter may be correlated with reliance on one or more other parameters. We found some limited evidence that this may be the case. In Experiment 4, participants who tended to increase risk estimates when density increased, also tended to increase risk estimates when crowds got larger or entities appeared to be hiding behind buildings (and vice versa). In Experiment 5, participants who relied on Group Size tended not to show reliance on Near Center, and participants tended to show shared reliance on relative heading-based cues for both erratic movement and common movement direction. This analysis suggests that though there are large differences across participants in relative reliance, certain parameters may receive correlated reliance, either positive-or negative-going, within single observers.
Applied Implications
In 2006, Wu and colleagues suggested that when individuals monitor crowds for emerging threats they might be particularly attentive to changes in the number of individuals within, and the density of, a crowd. These types of intuitive hypotheses are largely based on explicit, subjective reports from individuals experienced in crowd surveillance. These particular crowd parameters, number of entities and density, are also critical to estimating the impact of an explosion on individuals within a crowd (Kaplan & Kress, 2005; Kress, 2005) , and have thus received substantial attention within the extant literature. However, no work to date had attempted to empirically determine the range and relative influence of multiple crowd-level parameters on human risk estimates, and it could be the case that moment-by-moment influences on risk estimates may differ considerably from retrospective observer accounts. We believe that the present work takes an important first step in this direction, and can aid in the identification and weighting of crowd-level parameters for introduction into crowd tracking and modeling efforts.
Current concepts for detecting suspicious individuals within unstructured crowds typically involve multimodal architectures that not only use video feeds to monitor and analyze individual movements but also employ explosives sensors and on-the-ground spotters and screening measures (Lombardo et al., 2009) . When tracking individual movements, video feeds are typically processed by algorithms designed to identify predefined individual and coordinated behaviors (Silveira Jacques Junior et al., 2010; Zhan et al., 2008) . Predefining the behaviors worthy of further attention, however, is exceedingly difficult and often based on individual judgments rather than empirical data (Andrade, Fisher, & Blunsden, 2006; Cupillard, Bremond, & Thonnat, 2003) . As proposed by Zhan and colleagues (Zhan et al., 2008) , advances in the extraction of intentionality from monitored crowds is contingent on psychological experimentation aimed at human observation and deriving fundamental crowd behaviors indicative of emerging threats. Toward this goal, the present work sheds light on at least 10 individual-and crowd-level movement parameters that may prove valuable in modeling crowds for detecting potentially threatening events, such as suicide bombings and improvised explosives (see also; Cooke et al., 2010) . Furthermore, we also provide some data regarding parameters that a relative minority of observers may deem important, such as avoiding/fleeing, perseveration, and differences in density across a crowd. The present data provide a foundation for continuing model development and motivate continuing research toward identifying the full range of parameters individuals may use when identifying crowd-level threats.
Limitations and Unanswered Questions
The present research represents a first examination of crowdlevel variables that influence risk perception, and as such carries several limitations and motivates continuing research. First, as our experiments progressed we attempted to increase the relevance to real-world crowds, but we do acknowledge that such crowds do not typically move in a manner resembling random trajectories with collision avoidance. In fact, crowds tend to be oriented in particular directions, follow particular headings, show varied velocity, and show limited range of density. In contrast, our crowds moved in a highly varied manner, entities tended not to show similar orientations or headings, and entities moved at fixed and identical velocities with a wide range of emergent densities. How-16 ever, we note that our intent was to control as few factors as possible, allowing the simulations to display a wide range of unscripted entity behaviors. Also, we note that even with random motion, recent research shows that participants searching for threatening behavior engage the same neural mechanisms that are used when perceiving scripted threatening behaviors (e.g., chasing; Lee, Gao, & McCarthy, 2014) . Thus, while much progress has been made in simulating particular crowd movements (e.g., flocking, pursuit, stalking, chasing; Gao, Newman, & Scholl, 2009; Gao & Scholl, 2011) , we chose to begin this basic foundational research with relatively simple and unscripted behaviors. Continuing research, however, will begin to investigate intermittent introductions of scripted behavior into otherwise pseudorandom simulations, asking whether particular goal-oriented movement patterns are more or less likely to trigger spontaneous threat perceptions.
Second, it is difficult to determine the relative utility of individual-and crowd-level behaviors spontaneously monitored by observers. It could be the case that actual suicide bombing events cannot be predicted by monitoring any one of our 10 identified behaviors, but rather emerge either in the interactions among these behaviors or in a set of yet unidentified behaviors. This inherent limitation is because of a very small number of representative data sets detailing individual-and crowd-level behaviors immediately preceding a real-world bombing event, and is precisely why some government agencies have come under pressure for training observers to monitor for particular behaviors without demonstrating the predictive value of such behaviors in indicating an emerging threat.
Third, we found no reliable evidence that historical context modulated risk estimates. This result does not provide strong support for the claims of interviewed experts, or our hypotheses, which stated that providing observers with information regarding recent adverse events would lead to overall higher risk estimates. Instead, it seemed that observers relied on the movement patterns of entities rather than using a relatively top-down influence of prior knowledge. In our first two experiments, our control historical risk condition provided no explicit risk-related information. Our intention with this design was to capture some of the realities of crowd monitoring within military contexts in which surveillance may be done without any particular information regarding threat levels characterizing particular environments, crowds, or events. Of course, different participants may interpret such ambiguities quite differently-one might assume low risk whereas another might assume relatively high risk. However, if this were the case we would expect to see inherently high risk estimate variability in the control relative to low or high risk conditions, but data did not show such a pattern: we saw very similar variability within all three historical risk conditions. It could be the case that providing no historical information promoted a truly neutral criterion for detecting risks; it could also be the case that historical information, regardless of its presence or absence, does not wield strong influence over risk estimates in the current task. Of course, providing more salient risk information during a simulation, either verbally (e.g., updated intelligence) or via a visual event (e.g., a suspected terrorist moving into an area), might more reliably increase risk estimates. It could also be the case that our specific instantiation of crowd monitoring is not particularly influenced by contextual information, and this may not be reflective of real-world circumstances. These types of examination are warranted, given that directly perceiving adverse events in real-world contexts may prove more influential relative to receiving second-hand information regarding historical events in the context of a relatively basic simulation (Hirst et al., 2009; Neisser et al., 1996) . Fourth, we found evidence that real-time risk rating variation is not always tightly bound to subjective parameter reliance. In other words, observers are not always consciously aware of the full range of parameters used, or the timing or nature of their application, when generating risk estimates. Observers do appear to rely upon a very wide range of parameters over time, and reliance on any single parameter is often low. For these reasons, participants may not reliably recall the parameters relied upon for generating risk estimates on a moment-by-moment basis, thus limiting the reliability of retrospective reports. Continuing research in this regard may find value in incorporating think-aloud protocols during real-time ratings, which may or may not reveal reliable evidence for conscious access to monitored parameters.
Fifth, the nature of our participant samples varied across experiments, with our first four experiments using military personnel and our final experiment using a more general sample recruited via Mechanical Turk. Though it could be the case that the Turk sample shows different relative parameter reliance, we point out that our military samples had very limited deployment experience, and very few of them had any specialized training in urban surveillance; when they did, the training was introductory in nature and unpracticed. Among those with specialized training, parameter reliance was not reliably different from those without specialized training. In our experience, early career military samples tend to show similar behavior and performance on a range of cognitive tasks relative to university students. The Mechanical Turk sample was intentionally more varied and likely better reflects a more general sample of observer populations without advanced urban surveillance training. It remains to be seen whether those with advanced training and experience might show different parameter reliance attributable either to training or the accumulation of real-world experiences.
Sixth, we note that risk estimates seemed artificially high overall across our experiments. In our early studies we believed this pattern could be attributed to sampling from a population of soldiers, some of whom had experienced deployment. However, our final experiment used a relatively diverse sample and showed a very similar result, with participants tending to make estimates toward the center of the scale's range. Though our scale was explicitly anchored with "no risk" at the bottom, participants seemed to assume that the middle scale area was a relatively "neutral" area and tended to center their estimates in this region. This may partially stem from the fact that the risk slider always began a trial in the center position. In follow-up analyses, only a handful (n ϭ 74) of the 498 participants showed variation within a relatively low scale range (i.e., 0 -50%). Of course, our withinparticipants design is able to account for such baseline variation across participants.
Finally, we found some evidence that observers varied widely in the directionality of parameter reliance. In Experiment 5, for instance, some participants showed significant negative reliance on particular parameters, such as hiding count and proximity to buildings. In other words, as more entities were isolated from the crowd, or moving close to buildings, participants tended to decrease their risk estimates. Though one might hypothesize that isolated entities, 17 CROWDS AND THREAT PERCEPTION or entities moving near buildings, may appear suspicious and pose a threat, we believe the patterns of negative reliance are likely related to task instructions. Recall that participants were instructed to monitor the crowds for a suicide bomb attack, which implies a higher crowd density goal on behalf of a suspect; in other words, suicide bombers typically seek crowd regions with higher casualty potential (Hoffman, 2003; Richardson, 2006) . When individuals are moving along building perimeters, or isolated behind a building, such behavior may not match the inferred goal states of a suicide bomber, and may also be correlated with lower overall density. However, we also point out that the number of participants showing negative parameter reliance, and the strength of that reliance, were never as high or reliable as positive reliance on crowd size and density.
Conclusions
The present research took a first step toward identifying and characterizing some basic crowd-level variables that reliably modulate risk perceptions while people observe static and dynamic crowds. We consistently found evidence that risk estimates are strongly guided by crowd size and density, and further demonstrated predictive value of several additional variables that may prove valuable, though perhaps quite differently across individual participants. Together, our results suggest that empirical investigations into such crowd-level variables may prove valuable in enhancing the state of the art in sensor systems and algorithms responsible for tracking individuals and identifying suspicious behavior and, ultimately, preventing tragic events in crowded places.
